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International attention to Brazil has mainly focused on the country’s rising profile as an 
emergent power on the global stage, but it is the domestic dimensions of this rise that 
increasingly preoccupy informed opinion in Brazil.1 The evolution of opinions and 
actions in Brazil in the past decade indicates marked change both in the attitude of 
Brazilian civil society towards foreign policy and in foreign policy-makers’ 
receptiveness to civil society inputs into foreign policy debates. Specifically, President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–10) of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 
PT) took the reliance on presidential diplomacy to unprecedented levels,2 but at the 
same time signalled the importance of including societal inputs into external relations. 
To this end, he created the post of special adviser on international affairs (SAIA) within 
the office of the presidency. The holder of this office was expected to act alongside the 
ministry of external relations, traditionally referred to as Itamaraty. Whereas the special 
adviser’s role was focused on addressing cross-border relations with civil society 
actors—trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements and 
other groups—in the global South, Itamaraty continued to handle the formal and more 
traditional forms of interstate and multilateral relations, but with a growing openness to 
1 See Jeffrey Needell, ed., Emergent Brazil: key perspectives on a new global power 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015); Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew Taylor, 
eds, Brazil on the global stage: power, ideas and the liberal international order (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
2 See Andres Malamud, ‘Presidentialist decision making in Latin American foreign 
policy: examples from regional integration processes’, in Jorge Domínguez and Ana 
Covarrubias, eds, Routledge handbook of Latin America in the world (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 112–23; Sean Burges, Brazilian foreign policy after the 
Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), esp. pp. 158–84; Jeffrey 
Cason and Timothy Power, ‘Presidentialization, pluralization and the rollback of the 
Itamaraty: explaining change in Brazilian foreign policy’, International Political 
Science Review 30: 2, 2009, pp. 117–40. 
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societal inputs. Lula’s successor as president, Dilma Rousseff (2011–16), also of the 
PT, maintained the two-tier foreign policy-making structure.  
In this context it becomes interesting to investigate the changing role of business in 
foreign policy-making in the course of Brazil’s increasing integration into the global 
economy during the PT years (and beyond). Amorim and Malamud argue in their 
comparative study of Latin American foreign policy from 1946 to 2008 that Brazilian 
foreign policy was a complex blend of systemic and domestic determinants, but with a 
prevalence of ‘realist systemic variables’.3 The three domestic factors that they identify 
as being particularly relevant are institutional, ideological and bureaucratic—all factors 
strongly associated with the state (or at least the government). This article agrees with 
their overall analysis. However, it also argues that as democracy was consolidated in 
Brazil, another key domestic factor was the growing influence of societal actors in the 
foreign policy-making process and foreign policy decisions. As one prominent scholar 
of Brazilian foreign policy notes, the ‘plurality, diversity and heterogeneity of actors 
and agendas that directly or indirectly take part in foreign affairs are perhaps the most 
impressive feature of Brazil’s new face to the world’.4 
The growing role of societal actors in a broadening range of policy areas is unsurprising 
in the context of democratization. The challenge for policy-makers was mainly around 
the issue of how to involve societal actors in developing foreign policy agendas and 
actions that were seen as legitimate but did not hamper the coherence of diplomatic 
activity.5 Thus, the article examines two questions: first, why did Brazil’s push for 
emerging power status see foreign policy-makers involving civil society in the quest to 
achieve their global ambitions? And second, why did foreign policy preferences shift in 
                                                          
3 Octavio Amorim and Andres Malamud, ‘What determines foreign policy in Latin 
America? Systemic versus domestic factors in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 1946–
2008’, Latin American Politics and Society 57:4, 2015, pp. 1–27. 
4 Maria Regina Soares de Lima, ‘The cartography of Brazil in the world’, in Carlos 
Milani, Enara Echart Munoz, Rubens Duarte and Magno Klein, Atlas of Brazilian 
foreign policy (Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias 
Sociales (CLACSO) and Editora de Universidade do Estado de Rio de Janeiro  
(EdUERJ), 2016), p. 1. 
5 Pia Riggirozzi and Jean Grugel, ‘Regional governance and legitimacy in Latin 
America: the meaning of UNASUR’, International Affairs 91: 4, July 2015, pp. 781–97. 
 
 
 
 
the PT years, and to what extent did this change the level of influence of different 
societal actors? Borrowing from Milani, Pinheiro and Lima’s concept of the ‘graduation 
dilemma’ (as explained in their article in the special themed section of this issue of the 
journal),6 the analysis is based on a view of graduation not as an outcome but as a 
process. I argue that even though Brazil’s overall foreign policy goals did not change 
during the PT years, the country faced numerous graduation dilemmas, which raised 
contradictory expectations in international and domestic audiences. This required 
adjustments in its foreign policy actions and preferences as well as in the scope of 
involvement of societal actors in foreign policy decisions. The analysis also shows why 
shifting policy preferences (both pragmatic and ideological) changed the mix of societal 
influence. 
Two bodies of academic literature provided the background to the analysis developed in 
this article. First, the internationalization and domestic politics theories developed by 
Keohane and Milner7 with a group of other scholars shaped my interest in examining 
the political impacts of internationalization of national markets on domestic actors’ 
policy preferences, especially their foreign economic policy agendas, decisions and 
institutions. This literature indicates not only how internationalization generates new 
domestic coalitions around differential effects of increased openness, but also how it 
might affect the autonomy of government policy choices.8 Second, the analysis 
contributes to the power transition literature,9 including its adaptation, extension and 
refinement as proposed in the articles in this special section. At the forefront lies an 
interest, shared with other authors in this group of articles, in developing a more 
nuanced analysis that goes beyond states that challenge for primacy to include second-
                                                          
6 Carlos R. S. Milani, Leticia Pinheiro and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, ‘Brazil’s 
foreign policy and the graduation dilemma’, , International Affairs 93: 3, May 2017, pp. 
000–00 above. (page numbers not available yet) 
7 See the chapters in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds, Internationalization and 
domestic politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
8 Keohane and Milner, eds, Internationalization and domestic politics.  
9 See Ronald Tammon, ‘The Organski legacy: a fifty-year research program’, 
International Interactions 34: 4, 2008, pp. 314–32; Richard Lebow and Benjamin 
Valentino, ‘Lost in transition: a critical analysis of power transition theory’, 
International Relations 23: 3, 2009, pp. 389–410. 
 
 
 
 
tier states (especially non-nuclear powers) in the process of building international order 
scenarios and contributing to global governance.10 
The main sources for my research are interviews, speeches and writings of key 
businesspeople and diplomats along with official documents in the economic policy 
areas that relate to external relations. The analysis is presented in four parts. First, I note 
some of Brazil’s graduation dilemmas, involving both state and societal actors. Second, 
I examine how business actors organized themselves to represent their interests to PT 
governments and how they viewed their role in Brazilian foreign policy-making. Next, 
the analysis  considers Itamaraty’s responses to collective action by business, with 
particular emphasis on why state actors’ responses changed over time. The concluding 
section discusses why shifting economic conditions and policy preferences changed the 
level of societal, especially business, influence on foreign policy in the PT years.  
 
Brazil’s graduation dilemmas 
Brazilian policy-makers face a number of practical dilemmas related to the country’s 
rising influence in the global arena. The first—and the core—dilemma is this: is Brazil 
really ready to lose its status as a developing country (an implicit aspect of graduation)? 
Given its rising level of development and its consolidated status as a middle-income 
economy, it has already lost access to a variety of official sources of development 
assistance. For example, Brazil was removed from the list of beneficiaries under the 
Generalized System of Preferences in trade with the EU in 2014 and with Canada in 
2015.11 The EU dropped Brazil on the basis of revised rules in its Regulation 978/2012, 
which specified withdrawal of the scheme’s benefits if the World Bank ranked an 
economy in the high-income or upper-middle-income category in each of the previous 
three years.12 It was only a matter of time before graduation would see Brazil’s partners 
                                                          
10 See also Andrew Hurrell, On global order: power, values and the constitution of 
international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
11 UNCTAD, Generalised System of Preferences: list of beneficiaries (Geneva: United 
Nations Press, 2015). 
12 See European Commission, ‘EU publishes revised preferential import scheme for 
developing countries’; www.trade.ec.europa.en/doclib/press/index.cfml?id=840, 31 
October 2012 . (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article 
were accessible on 21 March 2017.) 
 
 
 
 
in the global South questioning its continuing credentials to speak in the name of 
developing countries. Certainly, its claims to emerging power status were increasingly 
incompatible with use of a discourse of the weak in the international arena.  
A second and more urgent dilemma is: can Brazil afford to pay the costs of graduation? 
PT governments understood that recognition as a global or regional power implied 
taking on the costs of leadership. Critics often question Brazil’s willingness to sustain a 
consistent ‘diplomacy of generosity’ and its ability to afford the organizational and 
system-management costs typically assumed by leaders. Others caution that Brazil 
needs to avoid becoming a prisoner of its followers’ expectations, a tendency that has 
already required Brazil to yield on points that were not in its self-interest in both World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and regional relations.13 Thus, for example, 
both business associations and labour unions have expressed some disquiet over 
Brazil’s acceptance of duty-free, quota-free imports from least developed countries as 
agreed at the WTO’s Bali ministerial in 2013.14 There were also many expressions of 
dissatisfaction in some groups of society with the so-called ‘strategic patience’ of PT 
governments towards Argentina’s actions in regional economic relations. Whereas the 
government argued that it was demonstrating regional crisis management capabilities 
and leadership,15 opponents doubted that this stance was in Brazil’s longer-term 
national interest.  
The third dilemma, and the particular focus of this article, is this: how can foreign 
policy-makers build support for graduation and a shared vision within Brazilian society 
for the country’s role in the international arena? This last dilemma relates to the 
difficulties foreign policy-makers and diplomats face in fostering favourable public 
opinion and civil society support, surely vital in a democracy. It has stimulated 
discussions on whether foreign policy should be viewed as just another public policy or 
                                                          
13 Charalampos Efstathopolous, ‘Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India and the Doha 
development agenda’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25: 2, 2012, pp. 269–
93. 
14 Sandra Rios and Fernando Panzini, Pacote de Bali, CINDES Breves no. 82, Rio de 
Janeiro: Centro de Estudos de Integração e Desenvolvimento, March 2014. 
15 Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, ‘Brazil as an intermediate state and 
regional power: action, choice and responsibilities’, International Affairs 82: 1, Jan. 
2006, pp. 21–40. 
 
 
 
 
something more,16 and how to involve societal actors in Brazil’s rise. By bringing 
societal actors into the foreign policy equation, state actors hoped to assure an active 
engagement with the PT’s project for increasing Brazil’s influence in international 
affairs.  
It is within this dilemma that the answer to the first research question is located. As will 
be shown, domestic actors not only conditioned Brazil’s rise, but also expected to shape 
it. To further flesh out the answer, my research focuses on business, which is one of the 
groups most active in foreign policy, and one that benefits from consistent access to the 
elitist circles of Itamaraty where foreign policy is still typically made. As such, the 
article’s focus is on foreign economic policy, specifically trade policy, although 
business has made its views known on a range of other foreign policy issues (e.g. the 
human rights and political aspects of the PT’s relations with Cuba, Venezuela and even 
Iran). In addition, the analysis explains why business influence waxed and waned 
relative to that of other societal actors during the PT years. 
 
Business foreign policy interests 
Brazil has long been a relatively closed economy, with foreign trade typically not 
exceeding 25 per cent of gross domestic product.17 Its economic development and 
industrialization in the twentieth century took place behind protectionist barriers and 
with heavy state intervention in the economy.18 This inwardly oriented path to growth 
and development meant that business rarely ventured into the realm of foreign policy-
                                                          
16 See e.g. the discussion in Monica Salomón and Leticia Pinheiro, ‘Análise de politica 
externa e politica externa brasieira: trajetória, desafios e possibilidades de um campo de 
estudos’, Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional 56: 1, 2013, pp. 40–59. 
17 World Bank, Trade as percentage of GDP: Brazil, 2016 
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=BR.  
18 There is an extensive literature on these aspects of Brazilian economic policy. See 
e.g. Edmund Amann and Werner Baer, ‘From developmental to regulatory state: the 
transformation of the government’s impact on the Brazilian economy’, Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 45:2-3, 2005, pp. 421-31.   ; Luiz Carlos Bresser 
Pereira, Developing Brazil: overcoming the failure of the Washington Consensus 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009); Werner Baer, The Brazilian economy: growth and 
development, 7th edn (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
making. The trade opening policies of the 1990s gradually forced business to 
restructure, modernize and look beyond the domestic market to better appreciate 
external markets as a source of both import competition and export opportunity. The 
structural transformation of the economy challenged past protectionist preferences and 
the defensive stances taken in trade negotiations.19 It also gave businesses a significant 
stake in the evolution of trade policy and encouraged them to look beyond their usual 
interlocutors in the state. As part of this process, they turned their attention to the 
ministry of external relations, Itamaraty.  
Business views and actions in respect of foreign policy most often centred on trade 
issues, mainly at the regional level, even before the PT was elected into government.20 
However, it must be emphasized that business did not have a single position, nor did 
business associations rely exclusively on Itamaraty to represent their foreign policy 
interests and trade policy preferences. Unsurprisingly, business preferences often 
reflected their situation in respect of global competitiveness. Typically, industrialists 
(including many of the multinational corporations operating in Brazil) adopted more 
defensive or protection-seeking positions, agribusiness  took more offensive and 
market-access focused positions, and the service sector was mainly domestically 
oriented. This situation remained more or less unchanged both before and during the 
years of PT government. How, then, did business seek to influence foreign economic 
policy, especially trade policy, during the PT years from 2003 to mid-2016? 
Industrialists were most likely to express their concerns about trade policy to ministers 
and bureaucrats in the ministry of development, industry and trade and the federal 
revenue department, but increasingly also to Itamaraty trade negotiators. Until recently, 
                                                          
19 Pedro da Motta Veiga, ‘Brazil’s trade policy: moving away from old paradigms?’, in 
Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Dias, eds, Brazil as an economic superpower? 
Understanding Brazil’s changing role in the global economy (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 113–36; Peter Kingstone, Crafting coalitions for 
reform: business preferences, political institutions, and neo-liberalism in Brazil 
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1999). 
20 Laura Gomez Mera, Power and regionalism in Latin America: the politics of 
Mercosur (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013); Marc Schelhase, 
Globalization, regionalization and business: conflict, convergence and influence 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
they expected the government and diplomats to defend their often protectionist interests. 
Definitive signs of change first appeared in demands made in 2010 by the National 
Confederation of Industry (CNI) for policies to support increasing Brazil’s participation 
in international trade in manufactured goods, especially greater integration into global 
production chains. The CNI clearly stated its policy priorities, both domestically 
(addressing systemic competitiveness issues) and abroad (export promotion, stable 
access to foreign markets, and a new institutional framework for foreign trade and trade 
negotiations).21 Midway through President Dilma Rousseff’s first mandate, a range of 
business association documents and industrialists’ statements show a step change in 
their attitude towards foreign trade. They began demanding a more competition-oriented 
integration into the world economy. The most important state-level association, the 
Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP), argued that ‘articulating a 
trade negotiation strategy that encourages Brazil’s insertion into international commerce 
and high-value supply chains is an urgent matter’.22 
Meanwhile, right from the start of the PT years in government, agribusiness worked 
closely with trade negotiators to push for better market access for Brazilian products 
and reduced state support for the agricultural sector in advanced economies.23 
Agribusiness made concerted efforts to inform Brazil’s positions in the WTO as well as 
in regional negotiations with the EU and for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
Agribusiness also used the National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) 
and legislators connected to the sector (the bancada ruralista) to represent their trade 
policy preferences to government. In contrast, the externally most active service sector 
in Brazil, the construction and engineering companies (empreteiras), were more likely 
to rely individually on presidential diplomacy to support their activities abroad as well 
as access to public bank credits to fund their foreign investments. It is in this context 
that the Brazilian Development Bank emerged as a formidable instrument of foreign 
                                                          
21 CNI, A indústria e o Brasil: uma agenda para crescer mais e melhor (Brasília, 2010), 
esp. pp. 177–96. 
22 FIESP, Proposals for the external integration of industry: position paper (São Paulo, 
2014), p. 1. 
23 Kirsten Hopewell, ‘New protagonists in global economic governance: Brazilian 
agribusiness at the WTO’, New Political Economy 18: 4, 2013, pp. 603–23. 
 
 
 
 
policy.24 The empreteiras tended to have minimal interaction with diplomats in Brasília. 
Instead, interviewees suggested that these firms were more likely to share business 
intelligence and on-the-ground experience with an embassy’s commercial attachés 
stationed abroad.  
Keeping in mind that there are many nuances and exceptions to this general picture of 
business’s preferred interlocutors in the state, the analysis here examines how 
industrialists and agribusiness represented their foreign policy interests and preferences 
specifically to Itamaraty during the PT years. Business organized itself at the national, 
subnational and sectoral levels. Business entities at all levels overhauled their 
organizational structures in the 1990s in the aftermath of economic stabilization and 
market-oriented reforms.25 As part of their restructuring process, they typically 
increased the resources available to their foreign trade departments, which were now 
asked to deal with three areas of trade policy on a continuous basis: trade promotion, 
trade negotiations and trade remedies. 
As early as 1996, the CNI had taken the lead in hosting the Brazilian Business Coalition 
(Coalizão Empresarial Brasileira, CEB), which coordinated business input into 
multilateral and regional trade negotiations. Alongside the CEB, a number of state 
federations of industry set up in-house trade policy councils, such as the Business 
Council for International Relations (Conselho Empresarial de Relações Internacionais, 
CERI) of the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN) and the 
Superior Council on Foreign Trade (Conselho Superior de Comercio Exterior, 
COSCEX) of FIESP. Interestingly, these councils were often led by retired diplomats, 
such as Ambassadors Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa at CERI and Rubens Barbosa at 
COSCEX. Sectoral associations, such as the Brazilian Association of Exporters (AEB), 
                                                          
24 Kathryn Hochstetler and Alfred Montero, ‘The renewed developmental state: the 
national developmental bank and the Brazil model’, Journal of Development Studies 49: 
11, 2013, pp. 1484–99; Mahrukh Doctor, ‘Assessing the changing roles of the Brazilian 
Development Bank’, Bulletin of Latin American Research 34: 2, 2015, pp. 197–213. 
25 Wagner Mancuso, ‘Lobbying to reduce the “Brazil cost”: the political strategies of 
Brazilian entrepreneurs’, in José Carlos Marques and Peter Utting, eds, Business, 
politics and public policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 242–70; 
Mahrukh Doctor, Business-State relations in Brazil: Challenges of the port reform 
lobby (New York: Routledge, 2017) {?} 
 
 
 
 
the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) and the Brazilian Association of 
Vehicle Manufacturers (ANFAVEA), also engaged in extensive activities geared 
towards influencing foreign economic policy at both regional and global levels. For 
example, ANFAVEA was closely involved in discussions around the formation and 
revision of the automotive sector regime within the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) as well as with other trade partners such as Mexico. 
Business financed think-tanks with highly technical and technocratic agendas, which 
conducted research and knowledge exchange activities involving public and private 
sector actors. Perhaps the best known of these is the Institute for International Trade 
Negotiations (ICONE), founded in 2003. It played a central role in informing Brazilian 
trade negotiators’ positions in the run-up to the Cancún  ministerial in 2003, and 
subsequent Brazilian positions on agricultural matters in the Doha Development Round 
(DDR). It also provided much of the technical input for the trade G20’s proposals and 
positions in the DDR.26 Also, agribusiness entities provided the technical information 
that allowed Itamaraty to request WTO dispute settlement panels against the EU (in 
respect of sugar) and United States (for cotton). As state actors’ reliance on information 
provided by societal actors increased, so opportunities increased for the latter to build 
up their political influence and policy impact.  
Business also was involved in highly personalized exchanges with the PT governments 
on issues of foreign economic policy. For example, interviewees at FIESP mentioned 
that various senior officials and politicians felt ‘at home’ with them; these included 
President Lula, who often received visiting foreign dignitaries and delegations at the 
headquarters of FIESP in São Paulo (I was told this happened about twelve times in his 
eight years in office). Similarly, interviewees mentioned that Brazilian foreign ministers 
and WTO representatives often ‘stopped by’ at FIESP headquarters on their way to and 
from important international meetings such as the World Economic Forum in Davos 
and the various WTO ministerial conferences.  
Thus, a plethora of business associations were in continuous contact with Itamaraty and 
other state actors. They monitored progress at policy and regulatory level as well as in 
                                                          
26 See Pedro de Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20 group of developing countries in the 
WTO, Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation, case study no. 7 (Geneva: WTO, 
2007); Hopewell, ‘New protagonists’. For ICONE, see www.iconebrasil.com.br/the-
institute. 
 
 
 
 
international negotiations. They also kept their own members informed about foreign 
policy issues, both by publishing monthly online bulletins and research reports for their 
members (often on new regulations and likely impacts of policy changes) and by 
organizing seminars (often on technical matters) and conferences (often involving 
policy-makers as well as business representatives). For example, the AEB has held the 
annual National Exporters Meeting (Encontro Nacional de Exportadores) for 35 
consecutive years.  
In addition to the symbiotic relationship based on knowledge-sharing between 
businesspeople and diplomats, there was also a notable difference in business’s relations 
with Itamaraty compared to its relations with other ministries. Typically, interactions 
between business interests and Itamaraty were highly elitist and very technically 
focused, rarely involving the wheeling and dealing seen elsewhere. Traditionally, 
business viewed Itamaraty as a pocket of bureaucratic excellence, although this view 
changed sharply in the latter half of the PT years, with business bitterly accusing the 
government of politicization of foreign policy-making. Moreover, Itamaraty did not 
have any real financial resources (credits or contracts) to distribute, which protected it 
from the struggle for advantage that other ministries were more likely to face. 
Finally, as PT governments sought to expand the size of Itamaraty (by 2010, Brazil had 
become one of the few states to have diplomatic relations with all members of the UN) 
and increase the diversity of the intake of the Rio Branco Institute (the school for 
diplomats), it was not unusual to see staff from business federations joining Itamaraty or 
external relations departments of other ministries. Ambitious younger staff at the 
foreign relations/trade departments of business entities were often well placed to pass 
competitive entrance examinations to take up civil service jobs in ministries dealing 
with trade policy related issues, including Itamaraty. Needless to say, these new recruits 
were familiar with business concerns and often maintained close ties with their former 
colleagues.  
In general, business was reasonably happy with policy decisions made in the first half of 
the PT’s 13-year tenure of the presidency. Initially, Lula’s commitment to improving 
South–South ties boosted Brazil’s trade performance more than could have been 
predicted (most notably with China). Of course, there were always some disagreements 
between PT governments and business on economic policy issues related to external 
relations and the international arena, but these were manageable. Clearly, business was 
satisfied with its ample access to the highest levels of policy-making during the initial 
 
 
 
 
Lula years. However, after the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, this apparent 
accommodation started turning sour. 
Initially hard hit by the global credit crunch, business took the view that the much 
lauded trade surpluses of the previous years had been a function of external demand 
during the commodity boom, and had little to do with domestic policy choices. Soon, 
what started out as grumblings about deindustrialization, uncompetitive manufacturing 
exports and minimal production integration at the global and regional levels gradually 
ballooned into robust criticism of a ‘self-imposed isolation’ via non-participation in 
bilateral and biregional trade negotiations. Thus, as well as being dissatisfied with 
slowing growth, business became ever more disgruntled with poor results in multilateral 
and biregional trade negotiations, frustrated with the politicization of relations within 
MERCOSUR,27 and worried about increasing competition from Chinese exports at 
home and abroad.  
These concerns and frustrations lie at the heart of business’s changing posture towards 
the government in general and Itamaraty in particular. Initially, the brunt of criticism 
fell on poor policy implementation, well expressed by Rubens Barbosa, the president of 
COSCEX: there was ‘no point [in FIESP] preparing studies, if the government—which 
does not have a long-term vision—does not help [with implementation] . . . there is no 
way that the private sector can do it all alone’.28 Soon practical complaints about 
industrial and trade policy issues took on a more politicized tone, with business openly 
denigrating what it considered to be the ‘ideologization’ of foreign policy. The PT 
government’s loudly proclaimed emphasis on South–South ties came in for specific 
criticism. Business, especially industrialists, argued that the PT’s increasingly 
ideological and interventionist approach to economic policy had excluded Brazil from 
the emerging patterns of global trade and investment flows (often involving the North). 
                                                          
27 See Mahrukh Doctor, ‘Prospects for deepening Mercosur integration: economic 
asymmetry and institutional deficits’, Review of International Political Economy 20: 3, 
2013, pp. 515–40. 
28 Rubens Barbosa, ‘Agronegocio e setor energético podem ser saída para o Mercosul’, 
cited in Agencia Indusnet Fiesp, 16 June 2015, 
http://www.fiesp.com.br/noticias/agronegocio-e-setor-energetico-podem-ser-saidas-
para-o-mercosul  
 
 
 
 
They were particularly dissatisfied with foreign economic policies during Dilma 
Rousseff’s period in office (January 2011 to May 2016).  
Analysis of the articles and speeches of top businesspeople reveals that they rapidly and 
increasingly became disenchanted with and resentful of the PT government’s ‘strategic 
patience’ with regional partners (for which read Argentina),29 policy accommodation 
with Brazil’s followers in the South,30 and weak strategy for dealing with China 
(something that Lula’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim,31 himself admitted could have 
been better handled). They even expressed their irritation with the perceived dilution of 
Itamaraty’s influence over foreign policy, and began vocally to demand a ‘foreign 
policy of results’.32 Among the top demands (sometimes articulated in rather strident 
terms) were calls for the government to be more active in negotiating preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) with important trade partners, without abandoning the priority given 
to multilateralism. These demands were often articulated alongside calls for more 
flexible relations with MERCOSUR, which from the business point of view meant 
either downgrading the customs union to a free trade agreement or allowing a ‘dual 
velocity’ approach to negotiating extraregional PTAs. Business harshly castigated and 
blamed PT foreign policy-makers for Brazil’s exclusion from the mega trade and 
investment accords, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, being negotiated around the world. Another key (but relatively 
new) demand related to the urgency of assimilating the regulatory transformations 
occurring in global trade flows into domestic policy frameworks. Business wanted state 
actors to act in anticipation of a hoped-for eventual integration of Brazilian production 
into global value chains and/or WTO-plus or WTO-extra agreements.  
                                                          
29 ‘Strategic patience runs out’, The Economist, 14 Dec. 2013.  
30 Efstathopolous, ‘Leadership in the WTO’; Mahrukh Doctor, ‘Brazil’s role in 
institutions of global economic governance: the WTO and G20’, Global Society 9: 3, 
2015, pp. 286–300. 
31 Celso Amorim, ‘Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003–2010): an 
overview’, Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, 53: special issue (An 
Assessment of the Lula Era), 2010, pp. 214–40. 
32 Rubens Barbosa, ‘Por uma politica externa de resultados’, Estadão, 9 Sept. 2014, 
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,por-uma-politica-externa-de-resultados-
imp-,1557082  
 
 
 
 
Finally, it is worth calling attention to a notable subtext in business’s growing criticism 
of foreign policy actions during the PT era, especially during the Rousseff presidency. 
Reading between the lines, it is clear that business was not only disgruntled with low 
growth, ineffective policy and insufficient engagement with global value chains, but 
also increasingly resentful of the growing inclusion and influence of other societal 
actors in foreign policy-making circles. This underlying elitist attitude was most 
obvious in the way that business as well as opposition politicians repeatedly described 
policy decisions in the PT years as the ‘politicization’ of foreign policy. Their criticisms 
seemed to suggest that business preferences were apolitical (apparently in contrast to 
those of other civil society actors), or that there was an objective national interest 
(beyond some minimum of state security and survival) to which all civil society actors 
could subscribe.  
To summarize, the analysis presented in this section provides answers to the first 
research question. It suggests a number of reasons why societal actors, specifically 
business interests, became increasingly involved in policy-making. It also discusses the 
various means business used to organize and represent its interests and views to state 
actors, especially Itamaraty.  
 
Itamaraty responses 
In many ways Itamaraty considered itself on the margins of collective efforts by 
business interests to influence policy. This, at least, was the traditional situation. From a 
diplomat’s perspective, business barely took any notice of Itamaraty in the days of 
protectionism and inwardly oriented development. However, according to interviews 
with diplomats, economic liberalization and trade opening policies in the 1990s forced 
business to take note of the opportunities in and threats from external markets. Business 
began to take an interest in influencing first regional integration policies, and 
subsequently multilateral trade negotiations. It is in this context that Itamaraty became a 
target of Brazilian industrial and trade policy lobbying—something for which it initially 
was not prepared. Itamaraty diplomats saw themselves as operating in the realm of 
‘state policy’. At first, it seemed shocking to them that foreign policy could be treated 
like any other public policy area (and thus become subject to the lobbying efforts of 
interest groups). 
In the context of the research questions addressed here, and compared to previous 
governments, two aspects of foreign policy in the PT years stand out: first, Brazil’s 
 
 
 
 
more assertive stance in trade negotiations; and second, foreign policy-makers’ greater 
openness to domestic political pressures. The two features were inextricably linked in 
many ways. When Celso Amorim took the lead in shifting Brazilian foreign policy 
towards a more revisionist and autonomous stance in multilateral institutions, he not 
only reinforced Brazil’s traditional preference for multilateralism, but also set the tone 
for a new, more inclusive approach to foreign policy.33 It should be emphasized that as 
trade negotiators and business networks worked together to shape Brazilian proposals in 
the DDR, these were always highly technocratic, but also politically informed, 
exchanges.  
Lula took care to balance ideological preferences with more pragmatic positions. He 
found business demands for growth-boosting trade policies compatible with his stated 
commitment to macroeconomic prudence in the pre-2008 period. All the same, and 
notwithstanding Lula’s pragmatic approach to economic issues, Brazil’s leadership of 
the trade G20 at the Cancún ministerial (and later efforts to continue to please its 
followers34) came at the cost of re-ideologizing global trade negotiations. Brazil’s 
decision to adopt a more confrontational stance and more distributive negotiating 
strategy35 to support  its emerging power partners, such as India, was often welcomed 
by other societal actors (mainly trade unions and NGOs) that formed important parts of 
the PT support base.  However, this was increasingly criticized by business, especially 
the competitive agribusiness sector.  
These two clashing drivers of PT foreign policy—ideological and pragmatic—could be 
kept more or less in harness alongside one another as long as the world economy was 
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growing and demand for Brazilian goods was booming. When economic conditions 
changed for the worse from 2008, their discordant goals generated irreconcilable 
tensions between the state and various societal actors. Even so, the lingering legacy of 
Lula’s early pragmatic approach could still be seen years later. In 2015, Ambassador 
Mauro Vieira, Rousseff’s second foreign minister and a career diplomat, insisted on the 
continuing importance of reassuring business that Itamaraty would ‘redouble [its] 
efforts in the area of international trade . . . promoting and defending the Brazilian 
productive sector, assisting it in its own initiatives and helping wherever possible to 
attract investment’.36  
As has already been made clear, Itamaraty’s interactions with business emphasize the 
value of technical contributions that help reinforce its foreign policy positions and 
negotiating strategies. This type of information is of greatest value to diplomats and 
trade negotiators, because it supports their actions in the international arena. It is well 
known that Brazilian diplomats favour presenting technically informed and research-
backed positions within institutionalized legal frameworks in the international arena. 
This is not an unusual preference for a professionalized diplomatic corps, as Allison has 
pointed out.37 However, the costs of generating these high-quality policy materials 
would be prohibitive without some of the onus falling on those societal actors 
(businesses) with the most to gain from their deployment. In any case, certain types of 
information can only be obtained directly from the relevant societal actors— which in 
the case of trade policy very often (but not exclusively) means business entities. 
Notwithstanding the apparent greater inclusion of societal input into foreign policy, my 
research found that Itamaraty still remained relatively distanced from civil society and 
insulated from day-to-day domestic politics. It had much more control over societal 
access to, and the nature of societal inputs into, foreign policy decisions than was 
typical of other policy areas. Also, diplomats often found that they could more easily 
override the views of other political actors, by virtue of their prestige, their specialist 
knowledge and the general perception that they were defenders of Brazil’s long-term 
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national interest. Thus, Itamaraty got away with consulting societal groups (mainly 
business) on technical issues, on its own terms, and when it chose to do so—essentially, 
operating a policy of invited contributions rather than open democratic access (as it still 
does). This seemed to be accepted not only by business, but also by politicians, the 
latter seeming persuaded that the executive’s dominance over foreign policy was of 
benefit to Brazil. 
Among the most significant changes to the traditional features and perceptions 
regarding Itamaraty and foreign policy-making was the ministry’s shift towards 
working more closely with civil society. With the creation of the SAIA, the split of 
foreign relations functions between Itamaraty and the new position itself hinted at a 
greater receptiveness to societal input. For the SAIA, this was indeed the point of the 
new role, but Itamaraty had to learn to reposition itself in this new political context. 
Thus, during the PT years, there was a marked increase in societal efforts to influence 
foreign policy. Whereas initially business relied on traditional elitist channels to 
communicate with Itamaraty, it soon felt elbowed aside by new voices from civil 
society. Moreover, the growing relevance of public diplomacy around the world also 
suggested that Itamaraty needed to become more open to societal views both at home 
and abroad.38 
Why, then, did the PT’s approach and Itamaraty’s response to societal inputs into 
foreign policy change over the party’s 13 years in government? My research showed 
that the shift in foreign policy-makers’ approach to societal inputs can be explained by 
three key factors: economic conditions, political leadership and societal interest 
representation. As already mentioned, the point of change seemed to occur immediately 
after the global financial crisis, rather than simply in response to a change of president 
(although changes in leadership style and preferences undoubtedly reinforced the shift, 
as discussed below). 
First, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 left Brazil’s confidence soaring, with a 
sense that it was less constrained by these events than many other states.39 Yet as global 
economic conditions changed in the aftermath of the crisis, the PT’s foreign economic 
policy preferences and targets also shifted. Whereas in the pre-crisis period Brazil had 
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proudly proclaimed its universalistic and wide-ranging trade exchanges (divided in 
roughly equal proportions between Europe, North America, Latin America and the rest 
of the world), recession in the advanced economies in 2008–2009 pushed the 
government into prioritizing economic exchanges and development cooperation with 
the South (especially Asia, but also Africa). Development cooperation brought other 
civil society actors into the picture, and these became central to Brazil’s growing 
economic (not necessarily trade) ties with the South. Although business retained a role 
as an important source of outward investment, the nature of the investment meant that 
the government switched attention from industrialists to the empreteiras. As noted 
above, the needs of the former in terms of Itamaraty interaction were very different 
from those of the latter.  
Under Rousseff, domestic economic conditions and policy choices changed markedly. 
She switched from the prudence-orientated macroeconomic policies of the Lula years to 
a more sharply developmentalist and state interventionist position. Soon, business was 
openly criticizing her so-called ‘new economic matrix’ even as it benefited from the 
many tax exemptions and subsidies offered. The tense relations between government 
and business were translated into sharp business criticism of the government’s 
seemingly more isolationist foreign economic policy. Many businesspeople interpreted 
Rousseff’s decision to cancel her state visit to the United States upon revelations of 
cyber-spying40 as a short-sighted political move that ignored important trade and 
investment interests.  
Another key reason for the shift in attitudes towards business/societal inputs was the 
change in political leadership style between Lula and Rousseff. Generally, the political 
discourse and foreign policy content of the PT years emphasized voice and inclusion for 
ordinary citizens (even if only at the rhetorical level). Hence, a greater openness to all 
societal actors, including business, should have been expected. During the Lula years, 
the president’s personal interest, political style and highly activist foreign policy agenda 
led to ad hoc but direct interaction between foreign policy-makers and business 
representatives. Gradually, various steps were taken to formalize societal inputs. This 
more routinized format better suited Rousseff’s policy-making style, but came at the 
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cost of diluting close ties between business entities and the government’s foreign policy 
agenda.  
Whereas Lula adeptly kept business and other societal actors apart in the two-tiered 
foreign policy-making structure (Itamaraty and SAIA), Rousseff seemed less inclined to 
do so. When Antonio Patriota, Rousseff’s first foreign minister (and a career diplomat), 
announced the creation of a Civil Society Forum for Foreign Policy in 2013, he thereby 
gave rise to much disquiet among not only business groups but also his colleagues in 
Itamaraty. The forum, which seemed designed to exclude business participation, 
generated considerable interest from trade unions and confederations, such as the 
Workers’ Central Union (CUT) and Union Force (Força Sindical). Patriota was also 
behind the launch of a series of talks called the dialogue on foreign policy (dialogo 
sobre politica externa), which aimed to stimulate wider public debate on foreign policy 
issues. Bringing trade unions and social movements into the corridors of Itamaraty 
materially and symbolically affected business’s privileged position in the foreign 
policy-making equation. Thus, it was no surprise when business interests started to lash 
out.  
It is worth noting that the foreign policy positions and strategies employed by Brazil 
during the PT years, based on calls for equity rather than legal and technical criteria, 
were much against the inclinations of traditionally trained Brazilian diplomats. Equally, 
diplomats (especially older ones) were often less than comfortable with the growing 
influence of trade unions, NGOs and other non-elite civil society actors in the realm of 
foreign policy. It is in this context that many of the most senior diplomats moved from 
benign tolerance of contacts with business to more overtly welcoming such interaction.  
The growing participation of civil society in foreign policy debates also created a real 
dilemma for Itamaraty. Diplomats were often caught between trying to respond to 
domestic societal pressures (often on economic issues, but also on questions of human 
rights, the environment, actions in the UN and so on) on the one hand, and attempting to 
satisfy the expectations of Brazil’s followers in the global arena on the other. As noted 
above, these two imperatives could pull in contradictory policy directions. Moreover, 
balancing these sometimes incompatible policy aims had to be accomplished without 
losing sight of what diplomats saw as their prime objective, that is, serving the national 
interest (however defined).   
Unsurprisingly, given the many changes introduced in the PT years, the harshest critics 
of so called diplomacia lulopetista (a disparaging term for ‘Lula–PT diplomacy’) were 
 
 
 
 
often diplomats themselves, along with previous ministers linked to the government of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). Needless to say, only those already 
retired from the foreign service could afford to speak openly in criticism of both PT 
foreign policy and foreign policy-making—and they rarely missed an opportunity to do 
so, whether in the press or at business and academic conferences. They repeatedly 
pointed to the PT’s ‘diplomatic deficit’ in the context of the Rousseff government. They 
loudly lamented that foreign policy remained a very low priority in Rousseff’s second 
government and feared another four lost years to industry. Criticizing the partisan 
approach to foreign policy, Barbosa wrote that ‘PT foreign policy broke with the 
domestic consensus, because, in many cases, it put aside the defence of permanent 
principles and the national interest, presenting weak results’.41 Meanwhile, Foreign 
Minister Vieira tried to reassure Brazilian business and promised a more pragmatic 
approach to foreign policy and a ‘results-driven diplomacy’.42 
Paulo Roberto de Almeida is among the most outspoken critics, referring to PT foreign 
policy as ‘infantile anti-Americanism’ and deriding ‘anachronistic anti-imperialism’ and 
‘myopic South–South relations’.43 Others were more circumspect in their comments. 
For example, Barbosa did not stint his criticism of PT foreign policy, but expressed it in 
much more measured terms.44 As a retired diplomat, he focused much of his concern on 
what he saw as Itamaraty’s marginalization and diminishing reputation for 
professionalism.45 Interestingly, most of his speeches or writings were signed off in his 
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capacity as president of FIESP’s trade council, COSCEX. Two former foreign 
ministers, Rubens Ricupero and Celso Lafer, both associated with the opposition 
Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), also lamented the changes in Itamaraty’s 
style and positions, especially the overly politicized preference for South–South 
cooperation which—in their view—brought few concrete material gains for Brazil. 
Others, such as Ambassadors Jose Botafogo Gonçalves and Roberto Abdenur, usually 
avoided outright political criticisms, but certainly did not have much praise for the PT 
government’s handling of economic relations with important partners, from Argentina 
to the United States to China. They often couched their comments in references to their 
personal experience and the expert knowledge they had acquired when serving in the 
relevant embassies abroad.46  
To summarize, this section has answered the second research question, discussing the 
reasons behind the shifts in Brazilian foreign policy in the PT years.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The discussion above has shown the ambiguity of business views with respect to the 
graduation dilemmas facing the PT governments in Brazil between 2003 and 2016. 
While they accepted the gradual loss of developing country status resulting from 
(greatly desired) economic and social progress, they were less willing to support the 
government’s leadership commitments towards its ‘followership’ in the global South. 
They believed this was a mistaken strategy based on a flawed proposition (given that 
graduation implied Brazil would be less and less able to convince others in the global 
South that it spoke with their interests at heart). Also, Brazil’s natural resources and the 
prowess of its agribusiness meant that it did not share the concerns of many of its 
emerging power partners (most seriously, diverging from India’s positions over 
agricultural liberalization in the DDR). Similarly, business did not think the economy 
was in a position to take on the costs of graduation. In their view, Brazil could ill afford 
the levels of patience and generosity demanded by the PT’s chosen strategic partners 
and developing-country followers. This point was loudly and repeatedly made at the 
level of regional relations, with some quiet grumbling as well over multilateral 
agreements signed at the WTO’s Bali ministerial in 2013.  
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The concerns with respect to these first two graduation dilemmas spilled over into the 
third, namely how to build support for a nationally shared vision of Brazil’s role in 
international affairs. Despite business complaints about PT foreign policy, 
businesspeople, who had worked more closely with Itamaraty diplomats during the PT 
years than ever before, were well aware of the challenges that Brazilian diplomats and 
trade negotiators faced abroad. Therefore, they were more likely to appreciate the value 
of cooperation between societal actors and foreign policy-makers in achieving the best 
foreign policy results.  
The analysis has also indicated reasons for the shifting influence of different societal 
actors over the PT years. The level of influence exercised by business was a function of 
the changing weight that policy-makers assigned to their pragmatic and ideological 
preferences. In the first half of the PT period, pragmatic concerns, namely economic 
growth and macroeconomic prudence to boost investor confidence and competitiveness, 
exercised much influence over state interaction with business. The positive economic 
impacts of the commodity boom of the century’s first decade facilitated the 
prioritization of such pragmatic considerations. However, after 2008, the tougher global 
economic context and the increasing international acceptance of state intervention in 
markets revived the PT’s longstanding ideological proclivities in respect of both 
domestic and foreign policy. The slowdown in the economies of the North justified a 
turn to the South. In 2009, China for the first time overtook the United States as Brazil’s 
largest trade partner. Then, when Rousseff became president, she faced a more vocal 
civil society resentful of the privileged status business had enjoyed in foreign policy-
making during the Lula years. Gradually, more ideologically defined positions 
politicized foreign economic policy to the point where the social inclusion rhetoric of 
the early PT years came to be reflected in reality. Business elites and Itamaraty 
diplomats felt increasingly alienated from many government and civil society positions.  
My analysis shows not only that business consistently relied on Itamaraty diplomats to 
represent its foreign economic policy preferences, but also that it systematically ignored 
the other option, the SAIA. The PT made a political miscalculation when it blocked 
business representatives from acting alongside other civil society actors invited to 
participate in SAIA’s initiatives. This exclusion of business proved counterproductive. 
Business inclusion might have enabled the PT to reinforce support for foreign policy 
positions that bolstered Brazil’s global leadership, while also creating economic 
opportunities that generated investment and employment. Instead, it met with growing 
 
 
 
 
hostility, directed in particular at the ideological stance of SAIA, but also at what it saw 
as a ‘politicized’ Itamaraty. The evidence shows that business did not so much ignore as 
actively (and often vocally) oppose this alternative channel for foreign policy interest 
representation.   
This article offers numerous contributions to the debate on Brazil’s graduation 
dilemmas. Analytically, it demonstrates that civil society matters. No future analysis of 
Brazilian foreign policy will be complete without consideration of how societal actors 
feature as a key determinant of foreign policy-making. It adds breadth and nuance to 
Amorim and Malamud’s research discussing foreign policy in Latin America. 
Moreover, it refines understanding of the challenges of graduation as matters not just of 
foreign policy, but of domestic policy too. Empirically, it shows the growing numbers 
involved in foreign policy-making on both the supply (state actors) and the demand 
(societal actors) side of the process. The article provides detailed information for a key 
emerging power, Brazil. It applies Keohane and Milner’s insights to examination of the 
effects of internationalization and structural transformation of the economy on the 
attitudes and behaviour of domestic societal actors. The analysis shows how important it 
is to actively engage domestic economic actors and seek their support for government 
goals and ambitions—not least because state activism in global governance arenas often 
relies on societal actors’ technical inputs and political support.  
To conclude, the analysis has clearly demonstrated how business interaction with 
Itamaraty in the PT years was divided into two phases. At first, it proved much more 
productive than could have been predicted. In fact, relations between business and 
Itamaraty were characterized by constructive engagement on both sides, directly 
contributing to Brazil’s rising influence in the DDR/WTO as well as influencing some 
of Brazil’s most successful foreign policy initiatives. Further evidence of the close 
partnership between business and the PT (especially on matters of trade policy) is 
provided by the fact that the presidents of both the CNI (Armando Monteiro) and CNA 
(Katia Abreu) became ministers in PT governments, notwithstanding any ideological 
differences. In fact, Abreu was one of Rousseff’s staunchest supporters during the 
impeachment process in the Senate.  
Eventually, after years of stagnating investment, declining competitiveness and 
ultimately economic recession, business definitively turned away from the PT. 
Interestingly, the area where they had worked most successfully together also became 
the site of the harshest business criticism of the PT: its foreign economic relations and 
 
 
 
 
trade policy. Also, Rousseff’s inability to balance different societal actors’ foreign 
policy interests and her difficulty in reconciling pragmatic with ideological preferences 
put Itamaraty in an untenable position, complicating its efforts to defend Brazil’s 
national interest. Moreover, the political tug-of-war between the PT and the opposition 
over Brazil’s foreign policy direction made any serious debate about resolving Brazil’s 
graduation dilemmas futile.  
Thus, unsurprisingly, many of the critics of PT foreign policy celebrated when interim 
President Michel Temer appointed José Serra as foreign minister in May 2016. They 
believed a politically strong foreign minister and a ‘turbo-charged’ Itamaraty would 
focus on rebooting Brazil’s trade relations to bring them more in line with the stated 
preferences of business.47 They also expected Itamaraty to recover its influence and role 
at the centre of foreign policy-making. When Serra resigned owing to health problems 
in February 2017, his agenda was taken over by his successor, Senator Aloysio Nunes, 
another experienced PSDB politician who had been chair of the Senate Foreign and 
National Defence Affairs Committee. While it is reasonable to expect the new 
government to succeed in prioritizing trade, it will not manage to exclude other societal 
actors, specifically the trade unions and social movements, who were encouraged to 
voice their foreign policy preferences during the PT era. Moreover, Itamaraty will have 
to focus much of its efforts on re-establishing Brazil’s and its own image abroad—in 
both the North and the South—in the aftermath of economic crisis, corruption scandals 
and a controversial impeachment. To accomplish this, diplomats will need all the 
political support and societal help they can get.  
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